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1968 and The Paradox of Freedom* 
Michelle Boulous Walker 
University of Queensland 
 
[*This is an edited and updated version of a talk delivered in a session at the Brisbane Writer’s Festival 
in 2008. The session was entitled “Philosophy Forum: The Disappointment of Liberalism”.] 
 
Introduction 
To speak of the disappointment of liberalism is to infer expectation – an expectation of liberalism. 
And, indeed, this expectation runs through Clive Hamilton’s book The Freedom Paradox: Towards a 
post-secular ethics: 
“Why is it that, despite the wealth and freedom now enjoyed by most citizens of rich 
countries, we do not appear to be the autonomous, fulfilled individuals we were told our 
wealth and freedom would bring?”1  
Having, as a student, cut my political and philosophical teeth on the texts of Western Marxism (and 
in certain works of Existential Marxism and French Feminist Philosophy) I, for one, have never 
harbored this expectation of liberalism. So, to speak of disappointment, in the way that Hamilton 
does in his book, is for me not really an option. 
                                                          
1 Clive Hamilton, The Freedom Paradox: Towards a Post-Secular Ethics, Allen & Unwin, 2008, p. xi. 
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For all the good in Clive Hamilton’s work – and there is much – the problem that runs throughout this 
book is what we might refer to as the insistence of the individual. What do I mean by this? And how 
does this manifest in Hamilton’s analysis? 
In The Freedom Paradox Clive Hamilton asserts a problem – the problem of rampant consumerism 
and the (paradoxical) discontent this seems to generate. From here, he goes on to diagnose the 
sources of the problem, and then to offer a solution to it. A neat almost medical analysis. So, what 
are the elements of this diagnosis and cure and how do they relate to the insistence of the individual? 
 
 Step one: Diagnosis 
Hamilton draws a direct link between the radical liberation movements of the 60s and 70s and what 
he refers to as our current cultural malaise. The complexities of the critiques emerging from these 
movements are reduced to liberal demands for personal autonomy and rights. A clear line runs 
throughout The Freedom Paradox suggesting that these movements (that he characterizes as desire-
driven) are responsible for the “post modern individualism” that runs rampant today. Thus, they are 
responsible for what he sees as our current cultural malaise. 
But, this depiction of the liberation movements of the 60s and 70s conveniently leaves out the really 
radical nature of the critique of capitalist consumption (and its complex links with patriarchy and 
colonialism) that emerged at that time. Take the Situationist International. As Arthur Hirsch has 
argued, “The situationists did not moralistically oppose consumption per se but rather the 
‘totalitarian management’ of society which manipulates and conditions the individual to seek 
fulfillment in consumption instead of in creativity and authenticity. In consumer society the meaning 
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of life tends to be reduced to a quantitative expansion of material survival, leaving the question of 
the quality of life untouched. Everyday life is thus rendered boring and banal, an unending monotony 
of joyless consumption.” 2 Bernard Lacroix expressed a similar sentiment in relation to the 1968 
rebellion: “… just because it took many people a certain amount of time to understand that May did 
not announce a coming ‘revolution’, this does not then lead to the conclusion that it inaugurated its 
opposite, a ‘return to individualism’. It is wrong to conclude, in other words, that because the 
movement failed to seize state power it was either radically indifferent to the question of power or 
the prototype of a 1980s form of consumer consciousness”. 3 When in 1967 he prophetically 
announces that “Freedom is Violence”, Jean-Luc Godard sums up an entire revolt against a system 
run rampant.4 This is no simple liberal claim for autonomy. Far from it. It is, rather, a refusal of the 
ground or logic of advanced industrial society. It is a refusal of transcendent value packaged up in the 
form of commodities and things. It is a refusal, as well, of commodified relations between individuals. 
To reduce the liberation movements – the students revolts, the women’s movement, the movements 
for gay and lesbian rights, the ecological movement – to simple liberal assertions of personal 
freedoms and rights is to do violence to the complexity of their respective critiques. “The May 
Movement”, as Alain Touraine observed, “dispelled the illusion that improvement in production and 
                                                          
2 Arthur Hirsch, The French New Left: An Intellectual History From Sartre to Gorz, South End Press, 
Boston, 1981, p. 145. 
3 Bernard Lacroix quoted In Kristen Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2002, p. 74. 
4 Jean-Luc Godard, Weekend (1967). 
 
Counterculture Studies 1(1) 2018   67 
 
consumption result in a society in which tensions replace conflicts, quarrels replace disruptions, 
negotiations replace revolutions”.5 
Hamilton conflates sixties radicalism with the “me-generation”, arguing that the liberation 
movements of the 60s and 70s bore the seed of an egocentrism and a narcissism that gave birth to 
what was to become the moral confusion of Thatcher’s political and social individualism. The 
liberation movements, he claims, unleashed a self-centredness with the result that moral judgment 
could no longer be made.6 Yet, in this, the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the events of May ’68 in 
Paris, it is timely to recall – and perhaps draw upon – the radical and very specific nature of the 
critique of society that emerged at that time. To put this another way, it is important to refuse the 
gesture that collapses all Sixties politics into the “same”, in order that we re-engage with that 
moment in sixties radicalism that calls for a changing of the horizon – a horizon that goes well beyond 
individual liberal values and beliefs. In order to place this in context, let me quote briefly from the 
philosopher Luce Irigaray, who draws our attention to “the world-wide cultural crisis… exemplified 
by the student revolts that have arisen, and re-arisen in France and elsewhere since ’68”. Here she 
connects a contemporary concern with cultural crisis with the sensibility of the sixties. Where 
Hamilton constructs a causality between these struggles and our current malaise, Irigaray argues 
something quite different. She claims that: 
 
                                                          
5 Alain Touraine, The May Movement: Revolt and Reform, Random House, New York, 1971, pp. 79-
80. 
6 Radio National Interview with Fran Kelly, Breakfast: 1 August 2008. 
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“… it is from this same crucible of cultural revolution that various struggles – students, 
feminists of difference, ecological movements – have erupted and re-erupted in our 
countries. Their concerns live on, concerns often suppressed by powers blind to their 
objectives or by militants who barely understand the profundity and radical nature of what 
is at stake in these struggles. For it is not a matter of changing this or that within a horizon 
already defined as human culture. It is a question of changing the horizon itself – of 
understanding that our interpretation of human identity is both theoretically and practically 
wrong.”  
She goes on to point out that “If we fail to question what cries out to be radically questioned, we 
lapse into an infinite number of secondary ethical tasks…” 7. 
Arguably Hamilton in his analysis does just this – confuse the “secondary ethical tasks” (criticisms of 
consumer culture) with “what cries out to be radically questioned” (Western metaphysics itself)? It 
is possible that by blaming the liberation movements of the 60s and 70s for our current cultural 
malaise, he “barely understand[s] the profundity and radical nature of what is at stake in these 
struggles.” For, as Irigaray and many others point out, in this political radicalism it is precisely “a 
question of changing the horizon itself – of understanding that our interpretation of human reality is 
both theoretically and practically wrong.” Perhaps the problem is reducing the complexity of 60s and 
later 70s revolt to the terms “liberation” or “liberation movements”. In doing so, we cover over the 
complexity of the critiques that emerge at this time. To be sure, part of the “revolt” at the time is 
individual in nature – and, not surprisingly, for many women the lure of “personal freedom” for the 
                                                          
7 Luce Irigaray I Love to You: sketch of a possible felicity in history, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 20. 
(Darkened text is my emphasis). 
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first time in recorded Western history was significant. But, to reduce these movements and social 
critiques to notions of personal freedom entirely, is to do significant injustice to the larger concerns 
that fuelled discontent at this time. The liberal individual ideal of some feminism for women’s 
personal empowerment always co-existed with the more radical demand that society and social 
relations – in their entirety – be challenged and changed, not simply that women be granted greater 
access to the existing pie. Of course, the complexities here have, historically (in the West), been 
depicted in terms of the alternatives of liberal equality-based feminism and its more radical other – 
feminism of difference.  
While I have sympathy with Hamilton’s concerns, I have serious misgivings about his analysis. To 
blame the so-called liberation movements for the vacuous understanding that mainstream society 
today has concerning freedom (freedom as freedom of material choice), is to ignore the radical 
change that feminism, ecology, and numerous other movements have had – and continue to have – 
on the lives of us all. In this, Hamilton’s analysis is arguably complicit with and corrupted by the very 
liberal agenda he seeks to challenge. 
 
Step two: Solution/Cure 
Having diagnosed the ill, Hamilton goes on to suggest the cure, metaphysics as a counter to our 
malady of discontent. “Inner freedom” and the “moral self” are the base of an ethics of the individual, 
hoping (against all odds?) to do better. 
“Only metaphysics, the establishing of a fixed point (or moral self) within us, allows us to 
develop an ethical position (a post-secular ethics) free from the dangers of moral relativism 
and theology.” 
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Now of this metaphysics, Hamilton has the following to say: 
“In addition to individual and political liberties, there is a neglected third form of liberty – 
inner freedom – and it is the erosion of this freedom that explains the widespread 
unhappiness and alienation that characterize societies that are otherwise free and wealthy. 
Moreover, far from being an unfortunate parallel development, the erosion of inner freedom 
is associated with the social transformations that have given us such unprecedented wealth 
and privilege.” 8 
“Inner freedom” (or “metaphysical freedom”) is the key to a new and different approach to political 
philosophy, and – along with the moral self – it provides a metaphysical basis for a new ethics capable 
of addressing the excesses of our contemporary consumption and social malaise. This metaphysics, 
however, repeats certain familiar gestures, in that it values a “considered self” over and above the 
“superficial self” of appetite and desire. It privileges the noumenal “thing-in-itself” over and above 
the phenomenal “world of appearances”. Now, for those of us historically overdetermined by, and 
equated with, the world of phenomenon – women – this metaphysic sounds an alarm.  
Perhaps I can explain this with reference to Hamilton’s discussion of first versus second order 
preferences. In Part one of the book (dealing with the psychological reasons for the absence of inner 
freedom), he (in a discussion of our behaviour in the market place) pits second order preferences - 
reflective choice, free will, self-control, moral consideration and judgment, over and against first 
order preferences – impulsive purchase, urge, temptation, weakness and desire. What emerges here 
is an elevation of the “considered” or “true” self arising from moral consideration and restraint, over 
the superficiality of the “worldly” self of appetite. While the inner freedom, that ultimately comes 
                                                          
8 Clive Hamilton, The Freedom Paradox, p. 63. 
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with the considered or true self, leads in the direction of redemption, understood here as 
detachment and self-control, the superficial self (prey to self-deception and weakness of will) is shot 
through with a desire or appetite that can only be understood in terms of error. 
Anyone who knows their history of philosophy also knows that there is a tendency, in the West, to 
associate the weakness of appetite and desire with femininity and – more often than not – with 
women too. What’s interesting, in Hamilton’s analysis, is that his metaphysics aligns the error and 
insatiability of all those qualities associated with first order preferences with precisely those 
liberation movements of the 60s and 70s that we have already mentioned. These movements, caught 
in the lure of attaining personal autonomy, are depicted as responsible for the unbridled pursuit of 
desire. They have confused freedom with free choice and informed consent. In the process, he claims, 
they have “ceded to us unprecedented moral confusion”. Moreover, “The liberation movements of 
the 1960s and 1970s targeted other sources of oppression – sexual conservatism, subjugation of 
women, homophobia, and racism in its many guises. It now appears that, by removing sources of 
oppression based on gender, sexuality and race, these social revolutions have left us free to be 
miserable in new, more insidious ways.” 9 Of all these movements, it is arguably the women’s 
liberation movement – and its association with sexual liberation – that is of most concern for 
Hamilton. Indeed, his focus (in the book) on the insatiable sexual appetite of Catherine M stands in 
to validate his argument that the liberation movements can only be understood in terms of appetite, 
and thus moral error.10 The fact that he nowhere in the book attempts to engage the complexity and 
range of feminist work coming from the women’s liberation movement suggests, however, that his 
                                                          
9 Ibid., p. 4  
10 Ibid., pp. 42-3. 
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analysis harbors error of its own. As one involved in feminist politics and philosophy for many years, 
I am troubled by Hamilton’s failure to engage with these discourses and practices, and deeply 
concerned about the unconscious associations of his metaphysic – associations that, I believe, remain 
yet to be fully analysed.  
 
Conclusion 
So, what are we to make of all this? I want to suggest that a possible antidote to Hamilton’s cure – 
the insistence of the individual that I have been arguing against – is to shift the terrain of our 
discussion from freedom and individualized notions of happiness toward responsibility. This is to 
focus on our obligations to and for the other, rather than withdrawing into the moral perfection of 
our own inner free self. In short, this suggests a move away from the disappointing individual of 
liberalism (and metaphysics) toward something quite different. 
It seems to me that instead of focusing on questions of inner freedom and the interiorized happiness 
of the individual, we could – in the spirit of ’68 – return to what connects us, one to another. In the 
place of this freedom we could speak of responsibility, of obligation, of the ethical demand of the 
other, of responsibility as prior freedom. Now here, I invoke the work of the philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas, whose “Ethics as First Philosophy” remains, for me, one of the most critical texts of our day.11 
Levinas’ claim, that ethics precedes ontology, simply stated suggests that the Other calls us, obliges 
us, to be responsible for his or her needs – without appeal to metaphysical justification - simply 
                                                          
11 Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy”, in S. Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, pp. 75-86. 
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because the other is there and in need. This, too, is a radical departure from liberal philosophical 
ground – one that sees our very subjectivity as constituted in and through the ethical demand of 
others in our world.  
“One has to respond to one’s right to be… because of one’s fear for the Other. My being-in-
the-world or my ‘place in the sun’, my being at home, have these not also been the usurpation 
of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven 
out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing?… a 
fear for all the violence and murder my existing might generate, in spite of its conscious and 
intentional innocence. A fear which reaches back past my ‘self-consciousness’…” 12 (“Ethics 
as First Philosophy”, p.82). 
So, in this year - the fiftieth anniversary of the events of May ’68 – we might remind ourselves of a 
freedom that differs from the hollow freedom of consumption and choice that our market would 
have us celebrate. We might remember a freedom that involves rebellion rather than success. In 
doing so, we reject a one-dimensional freedom that means succeeding in material terms. We do so 
in order to resist the very system that threatens in us what makes us truly human – our obligations 
and responsibilities for others and for our world. And in remembering this kind of freedom we might 
also recall the movements and struggles that have over long years helped keep the resistance alive. 
To say this is to suggest that we move toward the other – embrace the other – for reasons infinitely 
other than our own moral perfection. 
 
                                                          
12 Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy”, p. 82. 
